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informed the pope of the latest developments in Ireland. It must also be borne in mind that the Vatican was not on friendly terms with Britain. The British had excluded the pope and the curia from the future peace negotiations in a secret treaty with Italy signed in 1915, the details of which the Vatican had soon obtained. But there was more. Plunkett said that he had been sent by Eoin MacNeill, which was also clearly stated in the letter. This would mean that, contrary to the commonly-held belief that MacNeill had been deceived by Pearse and others until the very last moment, he in fact knew about the future uprising. In 1933 a public controversy broke out between Plunkett and MacNeill, who totally denied having had anything to do with Plunkett’s mission in Rome. The whole episode remains a mystery. But it would beggar belief that a papal knight and a devout Catholic as Plunkett would have lied or deliberately misled the pope. 56
    In the meantime Captain Spindler and the Aud were approaching the Irish coast. Spindler had been spotted a few times by the royal navy but, to his greatest surprise, the British let him pass. In his memoirs he wrote: ‘Our luck in this respect began to seem a little uncanny. Could there be something behind it? Did the British know about our coming?’ 57 The answers to Spindler’s questions are ‘yes’. Captain Hall and room 40 had decoded the messages between New York and Berlin and deliberately chose not to inform the British authorities lest they should betray to the Germans that they had cracked their codes. Hall also believed that, if a rising occurred, it would be a golden opportunity for the British army to get rid once and for all of the Irish republicans who were badly equipped in arms. 58 In other words, the security risk would be minimal. It is known that Hall did warn Admiral Bayly in Queenstown, who patiently waited for the Aud to show up. 59 If Bayly had been warned it is most unlikely that somebody like Lord French had not been. It would have been totally irresponsible of Hall not to have warned the commander in chief of the home forces. As noted above, French would have welcomed the opportunity to give the Irish Volunteers ‘a real good “knock”’. But there is no evidence to substantiate this theory and some people had a rather poor opinion of French after his handling of the British Expeditionary Force in France. 60 Furthermore, Hall tended to act as a maverick. 61 Spindler arrived in Tralee Bay on Thursday 20 April, but as Volunteer planning had gone awfully wrong, nobody came to collect the arms. He decided to leave the next day lest he should be spotted by the British. The royal navy, however, caught him on Saturday. Casement arrived on Friday by submarine, but was caught almost on arrival. He was immediately transferred to London, where, on Sunday 23 April, he was interrogated by Hall in person. 62 Casement pleaded to be allowed to contact some people in Dublin to cancel the Rising, but Hall refused. According to Casement, he even said: ‘It is better that a cankering sore like this should be cut out.’ 63
    There is no reason not to believe Casement as it all makes perfect sense. As is well known, due to MacNeill’s last minute intervention, the Rising eventually began on Monday 24 April. On that day also, the German supreme army command called off its submarine campaign against Britain as the Americans had protested. 64 There was no need to upset the Americans, all the more since, theoretically, the Irish republicans should be fighting by now. The Irish phase of Verdun had begun. The Easter Rising lasted until Saturday 29 April when Pearse and the republican soldiers surrendered to the British forces. It caused about 450 deaths, 2,600 wounded, and the destruction of Dublin city centre. 65 In May General Sir John Maxwell and his courts martial had the republican leaders shot; Casement would be hanged in August. This upset the population but also shocked Prime