The War of 1812 Read Online Free PDF

H.O. Werner
, Men
in Arms: A History of Warfare and its Interrelationships with
Western Society,
revised edition (New York, 1956), p. 185.]
    Governor Prevost, General Brock in Upper Canada, and Sir John Sherbrooke, commanding officer in the Maritimes, had realized early in 1811 that the threat of war was serious. They knew that Britain could spare them little aid and that they would have to defend the colonies with the forces and means they had available.
    Sherbrooke had about 4,300 regulars, mostly in Nova Scotia. That colony had some eleven thousand men in the militia, but only half of them were armed and trained. The New Brunswick militia was too scattered and untrained and the Prince Edward Island and Cape Breton militias were too small to count as military forces. Halifax, a major British naval base, was the only town in the Maritimes with fortifications that troops could use to defend it. Clearly, the primary defence of the Atlantic colonies in case of war would be the Royal Navy.
    In the Canadas, Prevost and Brock considered their 5,600 troops too few. In addition to organizing training for militia units, they set about strengthening defences in several ways. Prevost asked Britain to send help, specifically requesting, for example, ten thousand muskets, two hundred sabres, and saddles and bridles to equip cavalry. The two main regiments he had, the 49th and the 41st, were due to return to England. The government told Prevost that in the event of war, he could keep these regiments as well as those (the 103rd and the 1st, or Royal Scots) being sent as replacements.
    During the spring and summer of 1812, Prevost sent what men and supplies he could spare to Upper Canada along with guns, money, and clothing. He asked Sherbrooke to send money and weapons from Halifax, and the first shipment of these arrived at Quebec in September. He also decided to keep the 100th Regiment, which was to have gone to Nova Scotia.
    All this was good planning and is evidence of the professionalism of these British generals. On the American side, there was little of this kind of careful, detailed preparation. As a result, the President’s authority to call out thousands of men would not be very effective in practice. Even when these forces were raised, they were not trained or properly supplied. Of course, the serious flaws of the American military structure were not evident to Canada’s defenders and so they expected an early invasion by numerous and powerful forces.

    The Canadas, the Maritime colonies,
and the northeastern United States.
    (Courtesy of Loris Gasparotto.)
BRITISH STRATEGY
    The Americans had the advantage of knowing when they intended to begin the war and, therefore, could choose where to gather forces and when to launch an invasion. For example, they could easily invade Canada from northern New York State and cut the St. Lawrence Route or even attack Montreal. Or if their objective was limited to Upper Canada, they could threaten it from their bases at Michilimackinac, Detroit, and Fort Niagara.
    Clearly, it was vital to Prevost and Brock to know about American intentions and timing, and so they had informants gathering details. Canada’s defenders had no desire to conquer American territory; they wished simply to repel any invasion. If they were beaten back, it was accepted British strategic doctrine that their troops would retreat to Quebec City and at all costs, hold on to that fortress until succour could come from Great Britain.
    But beyond that point, Brock and Prevost disagreed about strategy. Both before and after war was declared, Prevost opposed striking across the border at the enemy. He argued that a British attack would unite Americans in support of the war and would thereby increase thedanger to Canada rather than eliminate it. Brock asserted that Upper Canada could be defended and insisted that vigorous efforts ought to be made to retain it. The most effective strategy, he argued, would be to attack