The New Nobility of the KGB Read Online Free PDF Page B

controversy in that country, when in 1996 the prime minister was accused of spying for Russia and was forced to resign. Yakimishen was identified in the Polish media as the source of information about the prime minister’s involvement with Russia. According to Russian law, secret service officers are not permitted to sit on juries. In the case of Sutyagin’s trial, jurors were polled about past work experiences and were dismissed if they listed any involvement with law enforcement or secret services. While others admitted they had and were dismissed from jury duty, Yakimishen did not reveal his past, according to Anna Stavitskaya, Sutyagin’s defense lawyer.
     
    Irina Borogan called Yakimishen at home, but their conversation was very brief.
     
    “Grigory, we are preparing a publication about the Sutyagin case. Could you tell me, did you serve at the Russian Embassy in Poland in 1994-1996?” asked Borogan.
     
    “I pledged in court not to compromise the secrecy of the investigation, and the court has a copy of my work record book,” said Yakimishen.
     
    “But could you say whether you were working in Poland or not?” Borogan insisted.
     
    “Next question, please,” was the answer.
     
    “Could you comment on the scandal linked to your name that was widely covered by the Polish media?” asked Borogan again.
     
    Finally Yakimishen lost his patience and said, “I do not intend to answer any more questions. Don’t call me ever again.”
     
    It appeared that Sutyagin had been convicted of treason by a jury that included an intelligence officer previously involved in a spy scandal. More broadly, the Sutyagin case illustrated the way justice under Putin would be decided: not by rule of law but by arbitrary rule of a few people in power. The state had decided to make a point with Sutyagin by finding him guilty of treason. Despite evidence suggesting a rigged jury, he was sent to prison by all means possible. 15 In July 2010 Sutyagin was exchanged for one of the Russians recently accused of espionage in the United States.
     
     
    EVERY YEAR THE FSB reports the discovery of something on the order of a hundred traitors and dozens of spies. In 2008, according to the agency, 149 foreign spies were unmasked. In December 2008 FSB director Alexander Bortnikov told journalists, “The activities of forty-eight career officers of foreign intelligence services have been stopped, as have the actions of 101 local assets of foreign special services.” 16 Despite the impressive statistics, there is no equivalent number of actual prosecutions and trials on spy allegations in Russia every year.
     
    For example, the FSB considered “career officers” to be those foreigners whose activity was found suspicious and they were prevented from visiting Russia, while “local assets” were deemed to be those Russians who were suspected of the intention to sell state secrets to foreign intelligence services. The local assets cited in the statistics are never identified by name because most of them are so-called initiators—people who were going to contact the foreign embassies on their own initiative but were caught early. In most cases the intended recipients never got wind of them.
     
    Although the Russian secret services have had difficulty making spy charges stick, they have nonetheless reaped generous promotions for their efforts.
     
    In 1997, the secret services tried to prosecute military journalist Grigory Pasko in Vladivostok in the Russian Far East. Pasko had been working with a Japanese TV station on reports about nuclear waste dumping in the oceans. Because he was being paid by foreigners, he was an easy target for the Russian secret services. In the case, supervised by German Ugryumov, then head of the local FSB department, Pasko was accused of espionage. Pasko was acquitted in 1999, but in 2000 the Supreme Court tried him again. In December 2001 he was found guilty and sentenced to four years in jail. He was released