The Iraq War Read Online Free PDF

of the idea of pan-Arabism; but he hoped that a unified Arab polity would emerge in a monarchical form under Hashemite leadership. He was also disturbed by the rise of Jewish power in Palestine and, after 1948, became an active opponent of Zionism, while fearing the effects that militant anti-Zionism would have on stable Arab societies. At heart he was an Iraqi patriot, of a moderate and pro-Western cast of mind. For all his undeniable political skills, his essentially traditionalist attitude would eventually doom him to defeat by younger Arabs possessing fiercely anti-Western, anti-Zionist, anti-capitalist beliefs.
    Economically Nuri was a modernizer who would seek, through the investment of Iraq’s growing oil revenues, to better the lot of the people and to improve the resources and efficiency of the state. He was not helped by the characters of the monarchs he had to serve, or by the monarchy’s erratic fortunes. Faisal, a charming and intelligent man, died in 1933. He was succeeded by Ghazi, whose vaguely pan-Arab and anti-British feelingsattracted support from nationalists; he associated himself too closely with Sunni favourites, however, to foster national unity. His reign, like his father’s, was brief (1933–39), ended by a car crash. He was succeeded by his son, also Faisal, but, as he was only three years old at his accession, the monarchy became a regency, exercised by Prince Abd al-Ilah, brother of the infant King’s mother. Abd al-Ilah, who was to be Regent until 1953, shared Nuri’s pro-British outlook but unfortunately did not possess his political subtlety. His main interest lay in securing the future of the Hashemite dynasty, of which he saw the British as the best guarantors. That priority separated him from the Arab nationalist officers of the army – a force of increasing size, 41,000 by 1941 – whom he farther alienated by failing to disguise the social disdain he felt for them.
    That was bad politics. The officer corps, which had staged a minor
coup d’état
in 1936 to bring about a change of cabinet, was now the effective force in the country; no government could be formed without its approval and any government was obliged to promote the policies it favoured, pan-Arabism and, increasingly, friendship for the totalitarian régimes of Western Europe foremost. Matters came to a head in 1941. The Regent had attempted to reassert the principle of civilian control, with the object of strengthening the connection with Britain, by appointing his chief courtier, Rashid Ali al-Kailani, as Prime Minister, with Nuri as his Foreign Minister. The move was less well-judged than it appeared. Rashid Ali, like many Arab politicians of the period, admired Hitler and Mussolini and expected their victory. He also resented Britain’s preponderant role in Iraqi affairs, which the outbreak of the Second World War had emphasized. Britain demanded strict adherence to the Anglo-Iraqi treaty and, in particular, confirmation of its right to move troops through the country. By the end of 1940 Britain was also demanding Rashid Ali’s removal. He was determined not to resign and, during early 1941, set in train a series of events which led to the flight of the Regent and Nuri to Transjordan and to a military
coup d’état
. A new Regent was installed, Rashid Ali reappointed as PrimeMinister and, when the British insisted on extracting permission to send troops into the country, a military confrontation staged outside the British base at Habbaniyah.
    A curious little campaign then ensued. While Britain organized an intervention, to be launched from India and Transjordan, the Habbaniyah garrison attacked the Iraqi forces deployed outside the base on 2 May. The attackers consisted largely of RAF aircraft, which bombed and strafed the Iraqi ground troops to great effect; they were supported by a battalion of the Iraq Levies and two companies of the King’s Own Royal Regiment. Startled by the strength of the British