Tested by Zion Read Online Free PDF

When, after 1967, Palestinians found themselves living with Israeli democracy instead of Jordanian monarchical rule, they began to learn new habits. In fact, Palestinian civic life had taken off under the Israeli occupation, with a vastarray of NGOs formed – in part to criticize the Israelis but also mirroring Israel's contentious civic culture. Arafat's return from exile in Tunis was the end of all that; he crushed civic life and built a satrapy for himself and his equally corrupt cronies.
    This mini-rebellion in the summer of 2002 was a sign that Palestinians – at least, some Palestinians – might be tiring of Arafat andthat efforts to marginalize him might have significant internal support. Arafat announced that there would be new elections – parliamentary and presidential – the following winter, on January 20. On October 29, the PLC voted for an interim cabinet that would serve until the forthcoming elections. Yet even at the time, this seemed more like a clever Arafat tactic than a real concession on his part: The Palestinian electoral register was way out of date, new election laws were needed, there was no independent electoral commission, and it was highly uncertain that elections could be held in January. Arafat had simply bought himself more time. Sure enough, on December 22, Arafat announced that the elections were to be postponed indefinitely.
The Importance of Iraq
    These events transpired against the backdrop of ever clearer preparations for war in Iraq. The president sought both congressional authorization, which he obtained on October 10, and another UN Security Council resolution, adopted on November 8. Success in the November elections put the Senate back under Republican control, also strengthening Bush's hand. Iraq handed over a massive report on its alleged nuclear program in December, but the United States found that the report contained many errors and omissions and that Iraq was in “material breach” of its obligations under Security Council resolutions. The president's State of the Union speech on January 28, 2003, argued strongly that Iraq must and would be confronted: “If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm for the safety of our people, and for the peace of the world, we will lead a coalition to disarm him.”
    As war came closer, Tony Blair pressed harder for more action on a Middle East “peace process.” Blair later described his view in an interview:
Absolutely. Yes. I mean, I have always taken the view that although the Israel-Palestine issue is not the cause of the extremism, resolving it is a major part of helping with the broader strategy. And so particularly when we were going to have to do difficult things in Afghanistan, if we were going to have to do Iraq, our enemies would set this in the context of the West versus Islam; and the question is could we find a way of unifying the moderates in the cause of producing a different type of the Middle East. And to do that, I always thought Israel-Palestine was essential. 12

    It was evident by the end of 2002 that, barring a major concession by Saddam Hussein, we were headed for war in Iraq. So according to Blair's logic – and on this point he certainly had the full support of the State Department – progress in the Middle East was essential. For Powell, the mechanism forthe “peace process” was clear; it would be achieved through the Roadmapandhis diplomacy with the EU, Russians, and the UN Secretary General. At an NSC meeting on December 18, 2002, he called the Roadmap a “pretty good product” that reinforced the president's June 24 speech and the vision it presented. Yet Bush did not seem persuaded that the Roadmap would work and worried that the sequencing was off: He had argued for security first, and that insistence was being watered down. It undermines the message on terrorism, he said, if we all appear to be rushing forward regardless of terrorist attacks and the lack of security reform on the Palestinian