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while Vasilevsky looked after Uranus. The forces deployed in each operation were more or less equal. According to Glantz’s figures the equivalent of 36.5 divisions were used in theMars offensive and 34.5 for Uranus. Total Soviet forces deployed against Army Group Center numbered 1,890,000 troops, 24,682 guns and mortars, 3,375 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,170 aircraft as against the 1,103,000 troops, 15,501 guns and mortars, 1,463 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,463 aircraft deployed against Army Group South.
    Glantz makes a powerful case, especially when Mars is placed in the context of the series of Rzhev-Viazma operations that took place in 1942. All three operations were on a similar scale and designed to land a crippling blow on Army Group Center. There is no reason to assume that Mars was any different. When Mars was launched on November 25, shortly after Uranus, the two operations were accorded equal importance in the Soviet press and the headlines emphasized that a dual offensive was in progress. Such headlines did not disappear until it became apparent that Mars was failing to make the same headway as Uranus. 23
    It is clear that Mars was much more than a diversionary operation but whether it was the “greatest defeat” dramatized by Glantz is questionable. It was more like Zhukov’s latest setback in the Rzhev-Viazma area. Moreover, the first two Rzhev-Viazma operations were as equally disastrous as Mars. At the same time, the positive achievements of Operation Mars should not be underestimated. It kept the Germans busy in the central sector while Operation Uranus cut a swath through their southern campaign. Operation Mars did not succeed in expelling the Wehrmacht from the Rzhev-Viazma area but it did enough damage to prompt the Germans to withdraw of their own accord in spring 1943.
    Operation Uranus, launched on November 19, 1942, was a combined three-front offensive mounted by the Stalingrad, Don, and Southwestern Fronts. The Stalingrad and Don Fronts had been formed on September 28 when Yeremenko’s Southeastern Front was renamed the Stalingrad Front and Rokossovsky was given command of the old Stalingrad Front, renamed the Don Front. The Southwestern Front, adjacent to the Don Front, was set up on October 31 under Vatutin’s command. The basic plan was to execute an encirclement operation, with the armies of all three fronts converging west of Stalingrad at Kalach.
    The counteroffensive began with an artillery barrage fired by 3,500 guns and mortars. The main attack north of Stalingrad was conducted by the 21st Army and 5th Tank Army of Vatutin’s Southwestern Front. South of the city the Soviets attacked with Yeremenko’s 51st and 57th armies. This dual thrust was supported by Rokossovsky’s Don Front. The plan was for Vatutin’s forces to advance southeast towards Kalach and for Yeremenko’s forces to strike northwest toward the same objective. At the same time an outer defensive line would be established along the Chir and Krivaya Rivers. An ambitious double encirclement of both the 6th Army and the 4th Panzer Army in Stalingrad and enemy forces in the Don bend was envisaged. (See Map 16
: Operation Uranus, November 1942
.)
    The counteroffensive was prepared in utmost secrecy and a number of
maskirovka
(deception and disinformation) measures were effected. 24 Front-line areas were cleared of civilians and the main assault forces were not deployed until the last moment. These measures contributed to the stunning success of Uranus in achieving complete operational surprise. By November 23 the encirclement of Paulus’s forces in Stalingrad was complete. Stavka had expected to trap 100,000 or so enemy troops. In the event, they caught three times that number and Operation Uranus became the Red Army’s first successfully executed grand encirclement maneuver. Among the enemy forces routed during the operation were the armies of Germany’s Axis