One Hundred Victories Read Online Free PDF Page B

decentralized model of security and governance in which the ruler in Kabul traditionally controlled the pursestrings, doling out money and patronage to regional power centers that in turn were expected to keep the peace in their areas. {14}
    Meanwhile, Admiral Olson had been pushing for the creation of a special ops command in both Afghanistan and Iraq led by a general instead of a colonel. He realized that a command in the region led by a colonel was simply not adequate. Each colonel that had headed it had struggled with a short staff, haphazardly filled with a few additional personnel. The churn was also a problem: the staff turned over every seven months. Most of all, a colonel simply could not get into the room where the big decisions were made. The number of generals and admirals in Afghanistan had steadily increased, and it took a quantum leap in 2009 when a new three-star operational command was created. That command, the ISAF Joint Command (known as the IJC), eventually tripled in size, to 3,000 staff and 19 generals and admirals. {15}
    The four-star general in charge of the Afghan war, General David D. McKiernan, agreed with the petition of Olson and others. Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command–Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A) was created in 2009, and Olson recommended Reeder as its first commander.
    When Reeder arrived in Kabul, he found that McKiernan had alreadyapproved and launched a local defense experiment called the Afghan Public Protection Program, or AP3. The pilot was implemented in Wardak, a critical province bordering Kabul, in January 2009 by Brad Moses, a special forces company commander. Afghans would recruit candidates who would be approved by the local shura , or consultative council. Recruits were vetted by the National Directorate of Security (NDS), the Afghan intelligence service performing internal security functions—the Afghan equivalent of the FBI. Given uniforms and paid half the salary of policemen, the recruits, following training, would be put to work as security guards at mosques, schools, bazaars, and other sites chosen by the locals. The AP3 volunteers were paid and armed with AK-47s through the Ministry of Interior, with the special forces providing the initial three-week training program.
    The initial pilot was approved with a ceiling of 1,200 recruits, but this number was expected to increase to as many as 10,000 if the pilot was successful. According to Brad Moses, the effort got off to a good start. But then it went sideways, owing to two main factors. First, the recruiting, vetting, training, and oversight role was handed off from special operations forces to the conventional unit in the province in mid-2009, and they did not spend enough time with the newly minted defenders to properly mentor them. The force then morphed from a self-defense effort into a highway police force defending Highway One. Recruits from other provinces began filling the ranks, setting the stage for AP3 to morph again, this time into a bribe-taking shakedown operation. Second, a local Wardak figure, Ghulam Mohammad Hotak, a former Taliban commander, switched sides. Moses regarded Hotak as highly nefarious and refused to involve him with the program during his tenure. But in December 2009, the Afghan government permitted Hotak to form his own lightly supervised AP3 contingent. {16}
    Reeder discussed expanding the AP3 program with McKiernan, but the latter doubted that NATO would agree. “They will think you are promoting warlords and militias,” McKiernan said. Reeder believed his idea would get off the ground only if influential Afghans embraced the effort. He went to see Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, the president of the Afghan Senate who had been president of the country in 1992. Animportant Sunni religious figure, Mojaddedi embraced the idea. “The only way you are going to protect the population is to arm them,” he said. “But you must put the special forces in the villages to prevent ethnic or