One False Step Read Online Free PDF Page B

and physical sciences would be connected to the living quarters at the conclusion of the construction phase. To protect against the danger of radiation, much of the base would be buried.
     The staff at the base would have tours of duty ranging from three to nine months, and would consist of a medical officer, eight engineers of various types, astrophysicist, chemophysicist, astronomer, biologist, and project officer; though the standard manpower rating was twelve, duty rotations through 1965-67 would see the base complement ranging from nine to sixteen.
     A secondary goal was the construction of a space station, in the familiar Von Braun 'rotating ring' design; this would have been assembled by the empty top stages of Saturn I and II launchers – the first suggestion that a station could have been constructed through the use of such 'waste' components. The orbital station would sustain a crew of ten, primarily focused on operations supporting the lunar base; planning documentation does not suggest a scientific role, but it can be assumed that they would rapidly develop were such a base constructed.
     Had ABMA been given the full go-ahead for Project Horizon, it would by necessity have become the primary agency for American space efforts. As tantalising a possibility as the construction of such a base is, it must be stated that the schedule given was hopelessly unrealistic. The development of the Saturn I might have reached the 1964 timescale, but the funding required to maintain such a schedule of launches would have been unlikely to be attained; about the only way such funding could have been made available was if there was evidence that the Soviet Union was working towards the same goal, and such a program simply did not exist.
     As for technical feasibility, this is a more difficult question. In this author's opinion, assuming that the funding was available, the systems devised could potentially – assuming a realistic level of development as more advanced systems, launchers and concepts became available – have completed the goal of building a base on the moon, but it seems most unlikely that it could have been completed by 1966!
     As ABMA was reaching its finest hour, it was nearing its end. When it had began its space efforts in 1957, there were a collection of rival space programs in the United States, and it became increasing apparent that such a confusing and chaotic situation could not be allowed to continue. The Eisenhower Administration was concerned not only that left to itself, the United States could sleepwalk into supporting a series of rival space programs, but there were also strong concerns that the bulk of space efforts should be operated under civilian control – not only to ensure that the scientific potential of space exploration could be fully exploited, but also because the primary military use of space in this period was covert.
     Initially, it was hoped that these projects could be co-ordinated, and in a bid to counter the Soviet lead in missile technology, the Advanced Research Projects Agency was created – a Department of Defence organisation that would focus on future projects – including space, as well as ballistic missile defence, nuclear test detection, and a range of other work. It was apparent fairly quickly that ARPA's focus would be distorted by having sole responsibility for civilian space programs, and ultimately the decision was taken to provide authority for America's space efforts to a body that was then known as NACA (National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.)
     This body was founded on the eve of the entry of the United States into the First World War, in 1915, and was tasked with pioneering new aeronautical techniques; in its history, the organisation more than attained this goal, but ironically, it was one of the few potentially interested institutions that had no ambitions in space. (This could have been part of the appeal – a fresh eye on 'space',