International Security: A Very Short Introduction (Very Short Introductions) Read Online Free PDF Page B

by NATO’s bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia in 1999, China’s downing of a US spy plane in 2001, and China’s use of a ballistic missile in 2007 to destroy an ageing satellite—implying as it did China’s development of enhanced missile capabilities and signalling the vulnerability of US space-based military assets. China’s booming economy and the fact that in 2010 it held almost $900 billion in US Treasury securities is also seen by some as a further sign of American vulnerability and of shifts in global power structures.
    Others, however, suggest that the high levels of trade between China and the USA may be a cause of optimism. Liberal theorists argue that trade and high levels of economic interdependence generally promote peaceful relations by significantly raising the costs of war. Moreover, China’s impressive economic growthfigures and increased military expenditures mask a range of internal tensions and weaknesses concerning endemic poverty, poor infrastructure, and widespread corruption, all suggesting that China is unlikely to want to add to these through adopting overly aggressive foreign policy postures.
    For its part China has emphasized that its intentions are benign and peaceful, that it intends to work within established international structures, and that it has no desire to assume the role of a global hegemon. Realists preoccupied with the imperatives of the security dilemma, however, will inevitably question whether Chinese claims should be believed and are liable to place more emphasis on the potentially destabilizing effects of overall shifts in the balance of economic and military power.
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Security regimes
    In contrast to realists others are more optimistic about the prospects for overcoming the problems and effects of the security dilemma. At the conservative end are those who argue that while the security dilemma remains an indisputable element of international politics its effects can be mitigated. One way of doing this is through the creation of ‘security regimes’. On many issues, states and other actors do accept, either explicitly or implicitly, certain rules and norms, perhaps also decision-making procedures, as fundamental principles guiding their behaviour. These rules, norms, and procedures are called security regimes. To the extent to which this happens relations between participants within the security regime may become increasingly cooperative and characterized by reciprocity and restraint.
    Although states may initially participate in a security regime because of perceived short-term gains, over time the benefits of participation may become viewed as outweighing those of leaving. The central benefit is that security regimes establish standards and rules of behaviour against which different states can be judged and even punished. As such they stabilize expectations and reduce uncertainty between states. For liberals, by fostering confidence and trust between participants, security regimes enable states to take a longer-term view of their interests, ultimately providing them with the luxury of prioritizing the absolute gains that might be derived through cooperation over the concern with relative gains that preoccupies realists. Beyond this, more critically inclined analysts suggest that participation can also result in the moulding of state interests and identities in line with the principles and norms inherent within the security regime. The result is that states might end up participating in security regimes, not simply because participation is seen as maximizing state interests, but because conforming to the regime’s norms and rules has become consistent with the state’s own sense of identity and of what constitutes appropriate behaviour.
    A good example of a security regime is the nuclear non-proliferation regime designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and which has been in development almost since their very first use ( Figure 2 ). In respect of