Hitler's Lost Spy Read Online Free PDF

requires adherence to the law. Photographing harbour installations in peacetime may be suspicious, but it is not illegal. When war is declared, it all changes.  Arrests and internment may be initiated on security assessments, not on proven facts. Enemy spies go underground, communications become more secretive, all movements are carefully calculated and contingency plans are put into effect. The Geneva Convention may have offered some protection to prisoners of war, but it did not provide anything to captured spies. If caught, a spy in wartime is on his or her own, and not subject to the ‘humane treatment’ the Convention stipulated for prisoners of war.
    The degree to which a spy must ‘adjust’ to wartime conditions depends on how well assimilated he or she is prior to the war commencing. In the above examples of Walter Ladendorff and Arnold von Skerst, their prominent level of public exposure meant that the extent of their community assimilation, i.e. the supportive level they may have expected from the community, was close to zero. It was hardly a secret as to who they were and which side they were backing. The choice for such people was to leave prior to hostilities commencing, go into hiding or be interned. Annette Wagner, on the other hand, required little or no assimilation adjustment after the war commenced. Had suspicions of her activities not been raised previously, and given the opportunity, she probably would have continued her work without disruption. She was, in fact, close to being a perfect  ‘sleeper’.
    Every Good Spy has a Good Story
    The departure or confinement of ‘known’ military or civilian spies from a country of interest is likely to occur when the agents are most needed – when war commences and the collection of strategic information becomes vital. A spy agency with foresight would have regard to this contingency and plan accordingly e.g. the  ‘sleepers’. In addition, new agents would need to be brought in, with the difference that ideally their origin, family and work history, and personal presentation would be unlikely to arouse suspicion. Added to this would be a legitimate reason for living in the country of interest. In late 1930s Australia, a female, born, raised and married outside of Germany or Austria, with a  ‘justified’ background and a reasonable purpose for her presence in the country should tick all of the boxes. On these considerations alone, suspicion of being a German agent would not exist. In 1938 many people entered Australia with convincing credentials, and amongst them was Annette Wagner.
    For a prospective enemy spy working in Australia in 1938 and 1939, being female (usually an advantage), Swiss born, raised from age seven in England, married to a French national and travelling to Australia to reside with relatives who had lived in England, is about as unsuspecting as it gets. Further, the ability to provide a British/French family and employment history would result in a difficulty for authorities to check any queries  – untarnished features are more likely to offer a cover for anything else. In addition, an official checking process conducted in foreign countries presented a timing problem. International communications were expensive and, following a declaration of war, the complexity in obtaining personal data would be increased several-fold.
    Protracted delays in international exchanges prior to or during the war would have been compounded by a surge in the number of requests between Allied countries searching for advice on personal information offered by suspected spies. A letter addressed to The War Office in London requesting confirmation of Annette Wagner’s details while in England appears in her file. A copy of the letter is marked ‘not sent’. It is probable that British intelligence at that time was overworked with requests to examine suspected spies and their possible