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superior finesse and flexibility and despised the idiocies of his master, was nevertheless very much at the mercy of his own destructive impulses. We shall see how he was to drive with all his power at the final centralization of his authority under Himmler; and we shall see how Himmler profited by this to the extent of allowing Heydrich to build up what was virtually a State within a State—within which, nevertheless (and here, I think, is the real significance of the odd and anomalous relationship of the Gestapo and the S.D.), Himmler kept certain features fluid. We shall also see how when Heydrich was killed in 1942 by Czech patriots Himmler hesitated some months before appointing a successor; and then he chose a man of very different stamp from Heydrich: the Austrian lawyer, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. This is generally taken to indicate that Himmler had come to fear Heydrich and was happier to replace him with a lesser man, lacking in vaulting ambition.
    It seems more likely that Heydrich had served his purpose by building up under Himmler’s eye the immense apparatus which was now running smoothly. For Heydrich was not the only dangerous man whom Himmler allowed and encouraged to play a dangerous game. At the very end of the war, when Himmler was at last deciding to commit himself to the bid for supreme power and a deal with the Allies, he “allowed himself to be persuaded” by one of the late Heydrich’s most gifted discoveries, Schellenberg, who started life in the foreign intelligence section of the S.D. and later came to control the unified intelligence service of the Reich, to treat with Count Folke Bernadotte.One of Himmler’s qualities which struck all beholders was his extreme caution and slowness in action. It seems likely, however, that he understood the desirability of swiftness and boldness as much as anybody else, but preferred to cover himself until success had been attained by allowing his subordinates, who could always be thrown over in a crisis, to indulge in the swiftness and the boldness.
    Certainly nobody who had not realized for himself the overriding importance of police activity in the new Germany could have set about the methodical conquest of police power with such steadiness of aim and sureness of foot. It could not all be done by Heydrich. One of the men Himmler had to conquer was Goering himself, who, those early days, was scarcely aware of the existence of Heydrich. The younger man may well have counseled and prompted; but when it came to action it was Himmler who had to meet Hitler and Goering face to face and make good his case—or rather his two cases: for Hitler he had one story, for Goering another. And he could not do this without knowing exactly what he was doing, and why. Anybody in a subordinate position who has ever tried to brief a superior officer to fight a battle with his equals on a matter which he does not understand will realize the truth of this.

Chapter 4
Gestapo and Revolution
    The battle for the Gestapo began even before Himmler took over the Bavarian Police in April, 1933. At first it was a long-range battle. By the time Hitler became Chancellor, Himmler and Heydrich between them had raised the number of the S.S. to fifty thousand, and the organization was very strongly officered. Himmler himself was known as the Reichsfuehrer S.S. (RFSS). Beneath him there tailed away a complete quasi-military hierarchy, from generals to privates, known by the terms invented for the S.A., of which the S.S. was still on paper a part. 1 It had been Heydrich’s idea to recruit in addition to the openmembership a shadow corps of S.S. officers who were to keep their affiliations secret until the Nazis came to power. Thus, in key positions all over Germany, including Government offices in which membership of any Party was forbidden, there were high-ranking S.S. officers waiting for the moment to reveal themselves and put on the black uniforms they had never worn. The