the stories copied and posted in the hangar. That
sort of thing just fired the guys up more, but to the public, and to Washington officials
keenly concerned about how things played on CNN, the task force was so far a bust. They
had been handed what seemed like a simple assignment, capture the tinhorn Somali warlord
Mohamed Farrah Aidid or, failing that, take down his organization, and for six weeks now,
they'd had precious little visible success. Patience was wearing thin, and pressure for
progress was mounting.
Just that morning Garrison had been stewing about it in his office. It was like trying to
hit a curveball blindfolded. Here he had a force of men be could drop on a building--any
building--in Mogadishu with just a few minutes' notice. These weren't just any men. They
were faster, stronger, smarter, and more experienced than any soldiers in the world.
Point out a target building and the D-boys could take it down so fast that the bad guys
inside would be hog-tied before the sound of the flashbang grenades and door charges had
stopped ringing in their ears. They could herd the whole mess of them out by truck or
helicopter before the neighborhood militia even had a chance to pull on its pants.
Garrison's force could do alt this and even videotape the whole operation in color for
training purposes (and to show off a little back at the Pentagon), but they couldn't do
any of these things unless their spies on the ground pointed them at the right goddamn
house.
For three nights running they had geared up to launch at a house where Aidid was either
present or about to be (so the general's spies told him). Every time they had failed to
nail it down.
Garrison knew from day one that intelligence was going to be a problem. The original plan
had called for a daring, well-placed lead Somali spy, and the head of the CIA's local
operation, to present Aidid an elegant hand-carved cane soon after Task Force Ranger
arrived. Embedded in the bead of the cane was a homing beacon. It seemed like a sure thing
until, on Garrison's first day in-country, Lieutenant Colonel Dave McKnight, his chief of
staff, informed him that their lead informant had shot himself in the head playing Russian
roulette. It was the kind of idiotic macho thing guys did when they'd lived too long on
the edge.
“He's not dead,” McKnight told the general, “but we're fucked.”
When you worked with the locals there were going to be setbacks. Few people knew this
better than Garrison, who was the picture of American military machismo with his gray crew
cut, desert camouflage fatigues, and combat boots, a 9 mm pistol strapped to a shoulder
holster and that unlit half cigar jammed perpetually in the side of his mouth. Garrison
had been living by the sword now for about three decades. He was one of the least-known
important army officers in America. He had run covert operations all over the world-Asia,
the Middle East, Africa, Central America, South America, the Caribbean. One thing all
these missions had in common was they required cooperation from the locals.
They also demanded a low threshold for bullshit. The general was a bemused cynic. He had
seen just about everything, and didn't expect much-except from his men. His gruff
informality suited an officer who had begun his career not as a military academy graduate,
but a buck private. He served two tours in Vietnam, part of it helping to run the
infamously brutal Phoenix program, which ferreted out and killed Viet Cong village
leaders. That was enough to iron the idealism out of anybody. Garrison had risen to
general without exercising the more politic demands of generalship, which called for
graceful euphemism and frequent obfuscation. He was a blunt realist who avoided the pomp
and pretense of upper-echelon military life. Soldiering was about fighting. It was about
killing people before