American History Revised Read Online Free PDF Page B

American and French sea captains.
    In early 1781, the Americans and the British were getting ready for the showdown and anticipated end of their long war. Washington pinned his hopes on the arrival of French reinforcements from the Caribbean. Waiting in the Caribbean, to knock out the arriving French fleet of Admiral Henri de Grasse, was commanding British admiral Sir George Rodney. Also waiting in the nearby Leeward Islands was Rodney’s junior admiral, Alexander Hood. On March 21, British spies in France prepared an intelligence report to Rodney informing him of de Grasse’s departure the following day: fleet size 173, headed by the world’s biggest warship, destination Leeward Islands. Rodney should immediately get together with Hood and prepare to annihilate the oncoming Henri de Grasse.
    The report was put on a fast mail cutter headed for the Caribbean. But by the time Rodney got the report, it was too late. Delivered by British sea captains who did not know the currents of the Gulf Stream, the report reached Rodney a week after de Grasse had arrived in the Leeward Islands and fought Admiral Hood into submission.
    That a huge French armada could out-race a British mail cutter across the Atlantic was not only remarkable, it was pivotal. Had Rodney been able to get together with Hood to stop de Grasse, the battle at Yorktown would not have occurred and the British would have won the war. Yankee ingenuity and inventiveness—and whales—played a key role in saving America.
    Still, all was not lost for the British. In fact, they still had the advantage. Come fall of 1781, after a year of marching through the south “like an English knife through colonial butter,” the British army under General Cornwallis arrived at York townfor the pivotal showdown. It was a time, says British historian Robert Harvey, when “the Americans’ own view was that they had probably lost the war.” Even Washington was despondent: “We are at the end of our tether.” Cornwallis had slightly more troops than the rebels, but he also had to contend with a huge contingent of 11,000 French troops that had just arrived, thanks to de Grasse and the Yankee observation of whales. Finding himself outnumbered 16,800 to 7,200, Cornwallis urgently awaited the return of the powerful British navy, due to arrive on October 5 after completing repairs in New York.
    Inexplicably, the British shipyard took its merry time. Observed one English staff officer, “If the Navy are not a little more active they will not get a sight of the Capes of Virginia before the end of this month, and then it will be a little too late. They do not seem to be hearty in this business.”
    Pleas by Cornwallis went unanswered. Informed by the commanding British general that the British fleet would be ready in another two weeks, Cornwallis responded it would be too late.
    On October 16 the ships finally were ready. They took another three days to load up with supplies and ammunition, then another five days to reach the Chesapeake on October 24, only to learn that they had come too late. Cornwallis, lacking naval reinforcements, had surrendered his entire army on October 18, six days earlier.
Three Financiers Who Put Their Entire Wealth on the Line to Save the U.S. Government from Bankruptcy
    1782 Three times the U.S. government has teetered on bankruptcy/insolvency: 1782, 1813, and 1895. The government didn’t have the cash flow to meet its bills the following week, and it had nowhere to turn for credit. On all three occasions, it was rescued at the eleventh hour by a patriotic financier. The three patriots were Haym Salomon, Stephen Girard, and J. Pierpont Morgan.
    When the colonists rebelled against England, King George was confident of victory not because he had more soldiers, but because he had more money. “My one true ally,” he said, “is the rebels’ money—or their lack of it.” He was absolutely right, but occasionally in extraordinary times one single man can