the obvious worth of the C-5 fleet, though, it was costly to operate and maintain. A single Galaxy can require an aircrew of up to thirteen for certain types of missions, which makes it expensive from a personnel standpoint. Even worse, the C-5 uses huge amounts of fuel, whether it is carrying a full cargo load, or just a few personnel. Finally, Lockheed was never really able to keep its promise to make the C-5 able to take off and land on short, unimproved runways like the C-130. If you talk to Lieutenant General John Keane, the current commander of XVIII Airborne Corps (a primary customer for airlift in the U.S. military), he will lament the shortage of C-5-capable runways around the world. Not that anyone wants to retire the existing Galaxy fleet. Just that any new strategic airlifter would have to do better in these areas than the C-5 or C-141. It would have to be cheaper to operate, crew, and maintain, and would have to combine the C-5’s cargo capacity and range with the C-130’s short-field agility.
This was an ambitious requirement, especially in the tight military budget climate under President Jimmy Carter in the late 1970s. The foreign policy of his Administration was decidedly isolationist, giving the world the impression that America was turning inward and not concerned with the affairs of the rest of the world. This policy came crashing down in 1979, with the storming of the American embassy by “student” militants in Tehran, and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets. Suddenly, there was the feeling in the U.S. that we needed to be able to project power around the world, and to do it quickly. Unfortunately, the drawdown of the U.S. military following Vietnam had left few of the kinds of transportation assets required to do such a job. Clearly the Carter Administration had failed to understand the nature of international relations in the post-Vietnam era, and America’s place in it. The United States would have to work hard to again be credible in the growing disorder that was becoming the world of the 1980s.
Even before Ronald W Reagan became President in 1981, work had started to rebuild America’s ability to rapidly deploy forces overseas. The Navy and Marine Corps quickly began to build up their fleet of fast sealift and maritime prepositioning forces. 4 On the Air Force side came a requirement for a new strategic airlifter which would augment the C-5 in carrying outsized cargo, and eventually replace the aging fleet of C-141 Starlifters. The new airlifter, designated C-X (for Cargo-Experimental), drew on experience the Air Force gained from a technology demonstration program in the mid-1970s. During this program, called the Advanced Medium Short-field Transport (or AMST for short), the USAF had funded a pair of unique technology test beds (the Boeing YC-14 and the McDonnell Douglas YC-15) to try out new ideas for airlift aircraft. Some USAF officials had even hoped that one of the two prototypes might become the basis for a C-130 re-placement.However, the sterling qualities of the “Herky Bird” and the awesome lobbying power of then-Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia dispelled that notion. Instead, the technologies demonstrated by the AMST program were incorporated into the request for proposals for the C-X, which was awarded to Douglas in 1981.
Despite the excellent proposal submitted by Douglas and the best of government intentions, the C-X became a star-crossed aircraft. Delayed by funding problems and the decision to procure additional C-5s first, this new bird seemed at times as if it would never fly. In spite of all this, by the mid- 1980s there was a firm design (now known as the C-17 Globemaster III) on the books, and the first prototype was under construction. The new airlifter was designed to take advantage of a number of new technologies to make it more capable than either the C-141 or C-5. These features included a fly-by-wire flight control system, an advanced “glass” cockpit which