35 Miles from Shore Read Online Free PDF Page B

and the flight resumed after a lengthy delay. The examiner occupied the jump seat, and the navigator sat in the cabin.
    Another problem that surfaced early on with the first dozen or so flights to St. Maarten was a problem with the fuel totalizer. The aircraft had four analog circular-type fuel gauges for the center tank, the forward auxiliary tank, and the two wing tanks, and a digitalfuel totalizer that indicated the total fuel remaining for all four tanks. The readout was in pounds of fuel. The amount shown on the fuel totalizer could change based on the density of the fuel. Fuel density was determined both by the type of fuel being used and the temperature of the fuel (colder fuel is denser and thus weighs more). Douglas Aircraft claimed that the fuel density error should be in the plus or minus 800-pound range for a fully loaded plane. ONA’s DC-9s were getting errors plus or minus 2,000 pounds.
    The problems with the fuel totalizer seemed to be more pronounced with the aircraft involved on the St. Maarten flights. It was determined that the problem was related to condensation forming on the fuel probes, especially the master probe. The aircraft was flying in very cold temperatures for up to three hours and then descending into a very warm and humid climate. The solution was to coat the probes with a plastic like covering in a procedure called plasticizing. The plasticizing didn’t completely solve the problem, but it did reduce the occurrence of highly erroneous readings. 3
    In addition to the problems with the fuel totalizer, pilots were reporting discrepancies between the planned fuel burn and the actual fuel burn. All of ONA’s DC-9s were burning more fuel than what the fuel planning charts indicated they should burn. Douglas Aircraft engineers were notified of the problem. Their response was to have ONA keep a fuel log for each of its DC-9s to help it more accurately determine the extent of the error. 4
    Steedman was made aware of the fuel problems during his weekly safety meetings. He wasn’t too concerned. Minor problems like these could be expected with new aircraft. The erratic fuel totalizer readings and the higher-than-expected fuel burns did not pose a safety hazard as long as the discrepancies were accounted for in the flight planning. Steedman did, however, call the dispatch office to ask for a summary of the St. Maarten flights that had been flown to date. He wanted to know what the average fuel burn was foreach leg, and he wanted to know what the average loads had been. The summary he received showed that on average planes were landing with just under 6,700 pounds of fuel. The highest fuel burns, as expected, were on the return flights to New York. About a third of the return flights had to stop in Bermuda for fuel. The summary also indicated that the average load factor was 67%. 5
    The agreement Steedman had signed with ALM required him to have the extra fuel tank installed by April 1, 1970. Steedman wanted the tank installed as badly as anyone. The St. Maarten flight lost money every time the plane had to land in Bermuda for fuel. But Douglas Aircraft had informed him that it was going to take three to four weeks to install the tank. The same plane flew all of the St. Maarten flights. The only plane Steedman had to replace it with was an older model DC-9 with slightly less range.
    Steedman phoned Octavio Irausquin to discuss the situation. He told Octavio that if they pulled N935F off the route to get the tank installed, the replacement aircraft would probably not be able to make the flight non-stop. If, on the other hand, they were to wait until spring or early summer when the loads dropped off, the replacement DC-9 could probably make the flight without having to stop for fuel. Octavio agreed. There were still several weeks left of the peak travel season. He didn’t want to inconvenience passengers unnecessarily by adding an extra stop. He told Steedman to disregard the April 1